The right of nations to self-determination, strategic friendships and Somaliland

The right of nations to self-determination is a basic democratic principle. Every nation has the right to decide its own future. In April last year, I wrote about the emerging state of Somaliland, located in the Horn of Africa. It is on the coastline of the Red Sea. Well, it seems I am not the only person contemplating the rights of Somalilanders.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also been cogitating on this question. More than that, he has taken action, declaring formal recognition of Somaliland on Boxing Day, 2025. Surely this is a momentous undertaking. Should not we be cheering for Somalilanders, congratulating West Jerusalem on enforcing a basic democratic principle?

Somaliland has been an autonomous statelet since 1991. Israel is the only country in the world to formally recognise its independence. Is not this a brave move?

Let’s not pop open the champagne bottles just yet.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is not driven by altruistic, humanitarian considerations, but by cynical, strategic motivations of foreign policy. Disguising its decision as a humane gesture, there are definitive economic and political considerations underlying such a manoeuvre.

As we will see, this is not the first or only time the Israeli government has used the rhetoric of national self-determination to hide manipulative socioeconomic calculations.

Let’s start with a map. This shows Somaliland, located in northwestern Somalia, in the Horn of Africa:

Somaliland and Somalia

Since the 19th century, the Horn of Africa has been the site of inter-colonialist competition. Britain seized the northwest portion of Somalia in the late 19th and early 20th century. Italy took control of the rest of the country. Control of maritime traffic to and from the Red Sea was of crucial importance.

The Bab-el-Mandeb strait leads out of the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Britain established a colony in Yemen, directly opposite to Somaliland, across the way from the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. Somaliland became a foothold for Britain in the Horn of Africa, and its importance for control of a strategic waterway was clearly understood by the authorities in Whitehall.

I think we can see the big geopolitical picture here.

The nation unified in 1960, after the British finally withdrew. Somalia has had a chequered history since then, and the Somaliland secessionist cause never went away. Former Somali strongman, General Siad Barre, waged a protracted bombing campaign against secessionist movements in Somaliland throughout the 1970s and 80s.

With the collapse of central authority in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, in 1991, Somaliland secessionists took advantage of the chaos and declared independence. Since then, the enclave operated as a semiautonomous unit, with its own government, currency and foreign policies.

What has all this got to do with Israel?

The Israeli government has, at least since the 1950s, pursued allies outside of the Arab world, namely in sub-Saharan Africa. The newly independent nations of black Africa found a new purported friend in Israel. The latter, the friend who calls only when they want something, sought to outflank the Arab states which surround and confront West Jerusalem. Actually the seat of the Israeli government at the time was Tel Aviv, but you get the picture.

Israel’s African outreach was articulated in the policy documentation and private diaries of its political establishment. Sub-Saharan African nations have traditionally supported the struggle of the Palestinians. Undercutting the international community’s support for the Palestinians only strengthens the Israeli government’s hand.

Daniel Malan, apartheid South African prime minister, visited Tel Aviv and met with David Ben Gurion in 1953. That was just the beginning of a mutually beneficial partnership. Apartheid South Africa received crucial military, economic and diplomatic support from Israel.

Ben Gurion, Moshe Dayan, Levi Eshkol and other Israeli leaders never made a secret of their tactics in cultivating strategic relationships. In 1954, Tel Aviv intended to support a new state in Lebanon – one only for the Maronite Christian minority. Exacerbating sectarian tensions, Ben Gurion made clear that he wanted such a state in South Lebanon. Why? To sign a ‘peace treaty’ with that nation, and gain access to the Litani river as the northern border.

A partitioned Lebanon, with a Maronite Christian secessionist state, would break down the bonds of Arab nationalism, form a friendly buffer, and provide Tel Aviv with economic opportunities.

It is no secret that Israeli leaders have deliberately cultivated relations with, and cynically supported, the independence ambitions of the Kurds, particularly inside Iraq. A non-Arab minority, the Kurds have found a vociferous advocate of their national self-determination in Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Somaliland’s capability as a forward base against the Houthis in Yemen is not lost on the Israeli government. The Houthis, actually they should be called the Ansar Allah movement, and Israeli forces have exchanged fire in the past.

There is another potential benefit in recognising Somaliland; the latter can form a potential dumping ground to relocate displaced Palestinians. While officially denied, the proposal to simply remove Palestinian refugees to a faraway reserve is not without plausibility.

If Prime Minister Netanyahu was serious about the right of national self-determination, he could start by stopping the Israeli military’s assault on Gaza, and recognise the existence of an independent Palestinian state. Then maybe his alliances with non-Arab nationalities not reek of hypocrisy.

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